Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1967

Western Mortgage Loan Corporation v.
Cottonwood Construction Company, a
Corporation, et al. : Appellants' Petition and Brief
For Rehearing

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Ray G. Martineau, Robert W. Edwards, Thomas A. Duffin, E. L.
Schoenhals, and Kent Shuearer ; Attorneys for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Western Mortgage Loan v. Cottonwood Construction, No. 10516 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3751

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN
CORPORATION, a corporation,

.-

~

\

\J\~'i\ 1

****

Defendants,

OSCAR E. CHYTRAUS COMPANY,
INC., a corporation, GIBBONS & REED
CONCRETE PRODUCTS COMPANY,
a corporation, RICHARD P. GARRICK,
BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION,
a corporation,

£0

...

\9'07

'
-------------------~
eou"· uwu

Pliaintitf-Respondent,

vs.
COTTONWOOD CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a corporation, et al.,

'-

---··(;\~·,~ S\lpre"'9

Case No.
10516

Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANTS' PmTION AND BRIEF FOR REHEARING

Intermediate Appeal from Interlocutory Pretrial Rulings
of the 3rd District Court for Salt Lake County,
Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, Judge
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Suite 300, 141 East First South NESLEN AND MOCK
Salt Lake City, Utah
1000 Continental Bank mdg.
Attorneys for Oscar E. ChytrausSalt Lake City, Utah
Company, Inc.

FABIAN AND CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Boise Cascade
Corporation

HALLIDAY & HALLIDAY
400 Executive Building
Attorneys for Gibbons and
Salt Lake City, Utah
Reed Concrete Products Co. ROBERT L. BACKMAN, ESQ.
CANNON, DUFFIN & PACE MILTONV. BACKMAN, ESQ.
19 West South Temple
Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Richard P.
Garrick
MARK & SCHOENHALS

903 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Utah Sand and
Gravel Products Corporation

Attorneys for Western
Mortgage Loan CorJ10iratfon
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEK.Ell

Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for First Securifty
Bank of Utah, N. A.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
page

APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF FACTS _______________________________ --------------------------

2

APPELLANTS' CONTENTIONS ------------------------------------------------

3

ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1

POINT I. UTAH SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION V. MECHAM IS NOT CONTROLLING
FOR THE REASON THAT IN THAT CASE THE
OPERATIVE DOCUMENTS DID NOT INCLUDE A PROVISION RENDERING THE ADVANCES VOLITIONAL OR NON-OBLIGATOR Y WHEREAS IN THE INSTANT CASE
THE OPERATIVE DOCUMENTS DO CONTAIN
SUCH PROVISIONS. ---------------------------- ---------------------------

4

POINT II. RELIANCE UPON THE PROVISION
IN THE MORTGAGE THAT IT SHALL ALSO
SECURE ADDITIONAL LOANS THEREAFTER
MADE CAUSED THE COURT TO ARRIVE AT
A WRONG RESULT AND IS ERROR BECAUSE
THAT PROVISION IS NOT PERTINENT TO
THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND WAS NOT
RAISED OR RELIED UPON BY EITHER APPELLANTS OR RESPONDENTS. ----------------- --------------

5

CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------·---------------------------------· 7

CASES CITED
Balch v. Chaffee, 73 Conn. 318, 47 Atl. 327 ( 1900) ____________________

5

Utah Savings & Loan Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah
2d 335, 366 P. 2d 598 ( 1961 )-------·-------------------------------- 3, 4, 5

W. P. Fuller & Co. v. McClure, 48 Cal. App. 2d 185,
191 Pac. 1027 ( 1920)--------------------------------------------·--------·---·-- 5, 6

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN
CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

COTTONWOOD CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a corporation, et al.,
Defend ants,

* * * *

OSCAR E. CHYTRAUS COMPANY,
INC., a corporation, GIBBONS &
REED CONCRETE PRODUCTS
COMPANY, a corporation, RICHARD
P. GARRICK, BOISE CASCADE
CORPORATION, d/b/a BESTWAY
BUILDING CENTER, a corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
10516

APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING

Appellants respectfully petition this Court for a
rehearing in this matter on the grounds that the Court
erred in its opinion filed on February 27, 1967, and as
reasons for such requested rehearing submit the follow•
ing brief.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Following are the facts essential to the questions
raised by this petition for rehearing:
The respondent, Western Mortgage Loan Corporation, and Cottonwood Construction Company entered
into a loan transaction for the purpose of building a
house on the lot in question. The agreement consisted
of several documents. In addition to a conventional note
and mortgage, these related documents embodying the
agreement of the parties included a "Building and Loan
Agreement and Assignment of Account" and another
document entitled "Release, Indemnity and Schedule A."
The "Release, Indemnity and Schedule A" provided
"that such disbursement of funds arc to be made wholly
within the discretion of the'' lender, and included another provision that changes "as to amounts and time
of disbursements may be made at any time by the [lender] as it may, in its sole discretion, determine."
The "Building and Loan Agreement and Assignment Account" included a provision in paragraph 10
thereof which upon specified default of the borrower
empowered the lender at its option to be released from
all obligations under the agreement, and allowed it, again
at its option, to take over the project, complete it and
charge to the borrower the funds so expended.
Part way through the building of the house the borrower defaulted while still owing the lienor-appellants
for materials furnished for the house. The lender elected
to complete the house, did so, charged its expenditures
to the borrower and brought this foreclosure suit.
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This Court granted interlocutory appeal from pretrial rulings of the trial court to the effect that the construction financing transaction provided for obligaory
advances and that certain work constituted the "commencement to do work ... " within the meaning of the
mechanics' lien law.
By its opinion filed February 27, 1967, this Court
upheld the rulings of the trial court, basing its decision
in material part upon the view that the construction
loan agreement here was the same as the agreement in
Utah Savings & Loan Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah
2d 335, 336 P. 2d 598 ( 1961), and upon language in
the mortgage providing that the mortgage "shall also
secure additional loans hereafter made .... "

APPELLANTS' CONTENTIONS
There are significant differences between the agreement in the instant case and Utah Savings & Loan Association v. Mecham, differences which render the two
cases exactly opposite, differences apparently not adequately called to the Court's attention in the first instance.

In addition, appellants respectfully submit that the
Court's reliance upon the "shall also secure additional
loans hereafter made . . . ." provision induced error because that particular provision is not pertinent to the
issues on appeal, and was not raised by or relied upon
by either appellants or respondents.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UTAH SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION V.
MECHAM IS NOT CONTROLLING FOR THE
REASON THAT IN THAT CASE THE OPERATIVE DOCUMENTS DID NOT INCLUDE A PROVISION RENDERING THE ADVANCES VOLITIONAL OR NON-OBLIGATORY WHEREAS IN
THE INSTANT CASE THE OPERATIVE DOCUMENTS DO CONTAIN SUCH PROVISIONS.
The transaction in the instant case is not similar to
the transaction in Utah Savings & Loan Association v.
Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P. 2d 598 (1961), for
there, according to the opinion and the briefs, there
were but a conventional note and mortgage to show the '
entire agreements of the parties. On these facts this
Court found an implied obligation to make advances up
to the amount of the note.
In the instant case there are express terms of the
agreement between the parties which negative any such
implied obligation. These terms, possibly inadventently
overlooked by the majority opinion, are contained in the
"Release, Indemnity and Schedule A" document and in
Paragraph 10 of the "Construction Loan Agreement and
Assignment of Account" document, all of which are integral parts of the loan agreement. (R. 151, Exhibits
W-2; Exhibits G and H to the Petition for Interlocutory
Appeal.)
The complexity, factual and legal, of this case and
the large amount of small print involved may have ob-
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scured the above provisions which are the ones which
form the issues involved in paragraph 1 of the trial courts
pretrial order.
The significant difference between the two cases is
noted in the dissenting opinion and is patent upon careful examination of the briefs and opinion in Utah Savings & Loan Association v. Mecham, supra.
In view of the language in the instant loan documents rendering wholly discretionary with the lender the
piecemeal advances of funds purportedly already loaned,
the anomolous result of the opinion appears to be that
even obviously optional loan agreements are, now by law,
obligatory in Utah.
This result is contrary to the rule universally applied
to such agreements by the courts See e.g., W. P. Fuller &
Co. v. McClure, 48 Cal. App. 2d 185, 191 Pac. 1027
(1920); Balch v. Chaffee, 73 Conn. 318, 47 Atl. 327
( 1900) and additional authorities cited at page 12 of
appellants' initial brief.
Clearly such a holding will serve unjustly to deprive
materialmen and laborers of the benefits of the mechanics'
lien statute intended to protect them from the combined
economic advantage of the lender and the borrower.
POINT II.
RELIANCE UPON THE PROVISION IN THE
MORTGAGE THAT IT SHALL ALSO SECURE
ADDITIONAL LOANS THEREAFTER MADE
CAUSED THE COURT TO ARRIVE AT A WRONG
RESULT AND IS ERROR BECAUSE THAT PRO-
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VISION IS NOT PERTINENT TO THE ISSUES
ON APPEAL AND WAS NOT RAISED OR RELIED
UPON BY EITHER APPELLANTS OR RESPONDENTS.
The majority opinion states that the appellants rely
upon certain langauge in the mortgage concerning loans
in the future, sometimes loosely referred to as "future
advances." The fact that this expression, "future advances," may have been used by the parties to describe
varying situations may have unintentionally led the court
to the conclusion that appellants were relying upon the
cited provision.
In point of fact, however, neither appellants nor
respondents relied upon this provision below, or raised
it on appeal or argued it. The reason is that it is not
pertinent to the issues raised on appeal.
Nor is there any argument that the lender made
such "additional loans."
What appellants do contend is that the provisions
in the "Release, Indemnity and Schedule A" document
make the agreement volitional or non-obligatory as to
advances before default and that the terms of paragraph
10 of the "Building and Loan Agreement and Assignment of Account" document (both of which are integral
parts of the loan transaction) make, in any event, the
advances admittedly voluntarily incurred by the lender
after default volitional or non-obligatory with the result
that such volitional advances take priority only as of the
time of each such advance. W. P. Fuller & Co., v.
McClure, supra.
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Using this "additional loans hereafter made" provision to justify holding admittedly volitional expenditures obligatory is erroneous on the facts of the instant
case and interjects into the law an undesirable twist.
Under the present opinion, regardless of the amounts
involved so long as they do not exceed the face of the
note, and even though there clearly is no obligation to
make advances, such advances will be held to be obligatory and thus prior to the rightful liens of materiahnen
and laborers who have by substance and labor improved
the land of others.
The present opinion gives construction lenders the
best of both possible worlds. As written, such lenders are
in Utah, without being obliged to make future advances,
afforded priority over intervening liens as though they
were so obliged. Appellants respectfully submit that in an economy in which state lines do not constitute a
barrier to the flow of commerce and the trend is all in
the direction of uniform commercial laws - Utah should
not thus break with the optional - obligatory rule which
elsewhere prevails. This is especially true as regards discretionary advancements before default.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, appellants respectfully
pray that this Court grant a rehearing in order that this
Court may reconsider its opinion herein.
Respectfully submitted,

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY
By Ray G. Martineau
C. Keith Rooker
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By Robert W. Edwards
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By E. L. Schoenhals
Attoneys for Utah Sand and Gravel
Products Corporation
903 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
NESLEN AND MOCK
by Kent Shuearer
Robert L. Schmid
Attorneys for Boise Cascade
Corporation
1000 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

9

CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
I hereby certify that in my judgment the
foregoing petition for rehearing is well founded
and that it is not interposed for delay.

